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Twenty Years of Devolution in
Scotland: the End of a British Party
System?




1 It is ironic that in the midst of a fierce debate over the United Kingdom’s future after it
leaves  the  European Union,  Roger  Awan-Scully  would  remark upon the  similarities
between the UK and European Parliaments “whose members are all democratically chosen,
but from a disconnected series of separate national contests”. This, he concludes, “is deeply
problematic  for  the  long-term  unity  and  integrity  of  the  UK”.1 In  fact,  the  European
referendum results of June 2016 revealed a striking contrast in the way the different
constituent  nations  of  the  UK  voted:  while  Scotland  overwhelmingly  supported
continued European membership with a 62% vote in favour of “Remain”, together with
Northern  Ireland  where  the  border  counties  and  Belfast  also  voted  “Remain”  as  a
majority, both England and Wales decisively voted to leave the European Union. Yet,
the geographical divides that characterised the outcome of the European referendum
should have come as no surprise given the increasingly divergent electoral results of
the  last  two  decades  in  each  of  the  four  UK  nations.  The  questions  raised  by  the
outcome of the European referendum over the integrity of the UK, with the risks posed
by the return of  a hard border in Northern Ireland and the possibility of  a  second
independence  referendum  in  Scotland,  are  symptomatic  of  the  changes  that  have
affected the British political landscape since the late 1990s. While the roots of divergent
political patterns across the UK may lay in the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of
the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales and the long decline of the Conservatives
north  of  the  border,  as  Roger  Awan-Scully  suggests,  we  shall  contend  that  the
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introduction of  devolution to  Scotland and Wales  in  1999  had the  most  direct  and
immediate impact on British party politics. 
2 Admittedly, devolution itself was introduced to rebalance political power in the UK. In
James Mitchell’s view, “the whole point of the Parliament was that it was meant to insulate
Scotland  from  a  Tory  government”2 after  the  idea  of  a  democratic  deficit  became
widespread during the Conservative governments of  the 1980s and 1990s for which
there was no majority in Scotland. Yet, with the dominant position of the Labour party
in  Scotland in  the  late  1990s  and the  structural  mechanisms integrated within  the
Scottish  Parliament  project  by  the  Scottish Constitutional  Convention  to  guarantee
smooth  inter-governmental  relations  and  prevent  the  likelihood  of  a  nationalist
majority,  there  was  little  to  suggest  how  rapidly  and  sharply  Scotland’s  electoral
landscape would diverge from that of its southern neighbour.3 
3 To the fracture between both ends of the political spectrum, new divides have now
been  added  that  cut  across  it  along  both  nationalist  and  unionist,  as  well  as pro-
European and Eurosceptic fault lines. This has led to the emergence of a distinctive
Scottish political debate which produces very different electoral results to those south
of  the  border.  The  June 2017  general  election results  are  a  case  in  point  as  Prime
Minister Theresa May’s majority in Parliament was only saved thanks to the surprising
addition of thirteen Scottish Conservative MPs. While the Corbynite youth movement
failed to take hold of Scotland where youths were widely radicalised and mobilised by
the independence movement, the success of the Scottish Conservatives was largely due
to their leader’s decision to differ from the Westminster leadership of the party and
run  a  distinctively  Scottish  campaign  that  successfully  combined  unionism  and
conservatism.4 It  appears  that  the  Scottish  electorate  no  longer  responds  to
Westminster  politics  in  a  similar  way  to  that  of  the  rest  of  the  country  and  that
devolution has created a de facto separate political system which spells the end of UK
party politics. This paper therefore seeks to examine British party politics in light of
the last twenty years of devolution in Scotland and assess the impact of devolution on
both the Labour and the Conservative parties, suggesting that both parties’ responses
to devolution have been key to the increasing rift between Scotland and the rest of the
UK.
 
The rise of Scottish nationalism
4 The SNP’s electoral breakthrough of 2007 set a momentum for deeper political change
in  Scotland.  Although  it  only  obtained  one  more  seat  in  the  Scottish  Parliament
election of May 2007 than its Labour rival (47 seats to Labour’s 46 seats),  the SNP’s
formation of a minority government paved the way for its success at the May 2011
Scottish Parliament elections when it managed to obtain an overall majority of seats
despite an electoral system explicitly designed to prevent this from happening. The
formidable  rise  to  power  of  the  SNP  in  Edinburgh  did  not,  however,  appear  to
correspond to any surge in either an exclusively Scottish identity or to separatism. The
successive  Scottish  Social  Attitudes  Surveys  published between May 1999  when the
Scottish  Parliament  first  came  into  existence  and  the  Scottish  independence
referendum of 2014 (after which the question was no longer included in the surveys)
show neither a hardened sense of identity in Scotland nor stronger separatist feelings
among Scots. The results of the surveys showed that there was no marked movement in
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favour of independence before the Scottish independence referendum of September
2014, as shown in the graph below: 28% of Scots were in favour of independence in 1999
when the Scottish Parliament first opened, 23% in 2007, 32% in 2011, 24% in 2012 and
32% in 2014 on the eve of the Scottish independence referendum.
 
Support for independence 1997-2014
Source : Results compiled from Scottish Election Studies (1992-1997), Scottish Referendum Survey
and Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (1999-2014).
5 Neither did devolution affect Scottish national identity. The Scottish Social Attitudes
Surveys admittedly witnessed a steep rise of the percentage of people who considered
themselves “Scottish and not British” and rejected a dual identity between 1992 and
the  introduction  of  devolution  in  Scotland  in  1999  (from  19%  in  1992,  when  the
question was first asked, to 33% in 1997 and 32% in 1999). Indeed, this can be explained
by the rejection of the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s as well as
initial  enthusiasm  for  devolution  in  Scotland.  However,  this  trend  has  tended  to
stabilise  since  then  (28  %  in  2016)  while  the  number  of  people  who  considered
themselves as equally Scottish and British has risen slightly, particularly on the eve of
the 2014 independence referendum (32% in 2014 and 29% in 2016). In fact, all trends
have been remarkably stable since the 1997 referendum, which suggests that neither
devolved  politics  in  Scotland,  SNP  electoral  victories  or  the  Scottish  independence
referendum of 2014 have durably affected Scottish national identity in the last twenty
years.
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Scottish identity on the Moreno scale, 1992-2016
Source: Results compiled from Scottish Election Studies (1992-1997), Scottish Referendum Survey
1997, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (1999-2016), ICM (2009). 
6 In fact, according to an April 2018 BBC poll by YouGov, the percentage of people in
Scotland who strongly identify themselves (61%) or fairly strongly identify themselves
(23%) as being Scottish is equivalent to the percentage of people who strongly identify
themselves (58%) or fairly strongly identify themselves (25%) as being English south of
the border. Besides, similarly to Scotland where national identity trends have remained
stable, polls have indicated that there was no hardening of an English identity either.5
Yet, the idea that national identities in the UK have become stronger in recent years
and are  weakening  the  British  Union has  become commonplace.  A  series  of  Policy
Exchange polls by Deltapoll of May 2018 found that 60% of people polled believed that
people today identify more with their home nation than with the UK than five or ten
years ago, 15% believed that people identify more with the UK as a whole and 19%
believed  there  was  no  difference.  A  majority  of  people  also  believed  that  stronger
national identities in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were weakening
the UK with 17% believing they weakened the UK a lot, 39% a little and a minority (26%)
not at all. Overall, most people held pessimistic views of the future of the British Union
with 52% believing it would not hold together within the next hundred years and only
19% believing it  would. If  these widely held beliefs are not supported by any sharp
surge in national identities in the UK, they most likely reflect the rise of the SNP in
Scotland and the growing political divergences between UK nations.
7 Indeed, while the SNP had trouble making any real electoral breakthrough in general
elections due to the first-past-the-post system and the fluctuating support for the party
before  the  introduction  of  devolution,  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  its  semi-
proportional electoral system provided the Nationalists with a new political platform
and  an  ideal  constitutional  set-up  to  advance  the  case  of  independence.6 Prior  to
devolution in 1999, the SNP had sought to win a majority of seats at Westminster and
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use that as a mandate for independence but any substantial electoral success failed to
materialise as the party was set back by the first-past-the-post system and had trouble
bridging internal divisions between gradualists, in favour of a step by step approach to
independence, and fundamentalists, advocating independence and nothing less. These
divisions  were  largely  overcome  after  devolution  was  introduced:  while  a  Scottish
Parliament fitted well with the gradualists’ strategy, fundamentalists found that the
Scotland Act 1998 created a new institutional structure in which the party would be
better able to win votes and seats thanks to its  semi-proportional electoral system.
Some within the party considered that Holyrood would serve as an easier political and
institutional platform to hold an independence referendum as it made the prospect of
an electoral majority more likely. 
8 The SNP’s strategy for independence therefore came to rest upon government office in
the Scottish Parliament as it presented several key advantages. The first was that the
SNP was able to use the powers and responsibilities held by the Scottish Parliament in
key  matters  such  as  health,  education,  agriculture,  fishing  and  fisheries,  or  the
environment, to name but a few, to articulate distinctive policies which fit well with
the overall centre-left consensus in Scottish politics, such as abolishing prescription
charges, scrapping bridge tolls or replacing the council tax with a local income tax.
These policies would also be given more traction as the Nationalists could present their
party as the only party with no British counterpart that could speak for Scotland and
defend its distinctive interests. In doing so, the SNP would also exploit the flaws of the
new constitutional set-up itself to demand more powers for the Scottish Parliament,
short of independence. This strategy therefore enabled the party to decouple voting
SNP  from  independence  as  it  made  independence  much  less  immediate.  The
discrepancy  between  the  percentage  of  votes  obtained  by  the  SNP  at  Scottish
Parliament  elections  and  the  level  of  support  for  independence  suggests  that  this
decoupling strategy was successfully achieved. While the SNP obtained 32.9% of the
constituency vote in 2007, support for independence was as low as 23% according to
Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys of that same year. Likewise, the Nationalists obtained
45.4% of the constituency vote in 2011, although support for independence then stood
at 32%. While the Nationalists managed to form a minority government in 2007, their
attitude  to  an  independence  referendum  during  their  first  term  in  government
suggests their awareness of the limited support for independence in Scotland despite
their  positive  electoral  scores.  Indeed,  the  party  prudently  proposed  holding  an
independence referendum in the latter stages of a Scottish parliamentary term and
preferred holding a vast public consultation on independence first, significantly named
National Conversation.
9 After having been on the fringes of political power at Westminster for years, the SNP
became  Scotland’s  second  political  party  as  soon  as  the  2003  Scottish  Parliament
election.  Its  formation  of  a  minority  government  in  2007  enabled  it  to  assert  its
competence  over  key  economic  and  social  issues  in  Scotland  whilst  attempting  to
develop at the same time a support base for its flagship separatist policy. Its avowed
strategy was to show that it was able to deliver on key policy pledges and boost voter
confidence in relation to a further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament,
before  perhaps  full  independence  for  Scotland.  Yet,  it  was  only  after  the  SNP
unexpectedly won a majority of  seats in 2011 on a manifesto explicitly pledging to
organise  an  independence  referendum,  that  the  party  was  able  to  build  up  on  its
promises and launch the Scottish independence referendum of 18th September 2014.
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Although the issue of independence had long been the party’s raison d’être and been
presented as its primary objective at a number of elections over time, it was only after
the SNP obtained 69 seats,  thus achieving to form the first majority government in
Edinburgh, that Scotland’s other political parties recognised the SNP’s mandate to do
so. 
10 In his seminal study of the SNP, Peter Lynch notes that the Nationalists’ unexpected
electoral success in 2011 and the opportunity provided to organise an independence
referendum meant  that  the party  had little  room for  error  in  devising its  strategy
ahead  of  the  referendum.7 Whilst  the  idea  of  a  two-step  referendum  on  enhanced
devolution and independence had been floated during their first term in government,
polls  indicated  that  there  was  no  widespread  support  for  independence  but  that
enhanced devolution appeared as  a  majority’s  preferred option.  The Scottish Social
Attitudes  Survey  of  2011  indicated  that  independence  was  only  supported  by 32%,
compared to 58% support for enhanced devolution. The two-option referendum thus
appearing counterproductive, and even threatening to the SNP’s desired outcome, the
intergovernmental  negotiations  with  the  UK  government  and  the  Edinburgh
Agreement  signed on 15th October  2012  therefore  led  to  the  setting  up  of  a  single
question referendum on Scotland’s independence. Yet,  the main difficulty remained
that of securing a Yes vote to deliver independence: the Nationalists would have to run
an “uphill struggle” type of campaign to convince a majority of heretofore sceptical
voters to change their minds about Scottish independence.8 
11 The  referendum  campaign  ran  from  May  2012  to  September  2014,  with  the  Yes
campaign having opted for a long campaign in order to allow itself sufficient time to
build  momentum  and  support  for  independence  across  Scotland  whilst  the  No
campaign was short (May to September 2014) and focused negatively on specific issues
such as  the  economy and business  interests,  the  currency used by  an independent
Scotland or EU membership among others.9 The analysis of the Yes campaign and the
conversion of large numbers of people to support independence from a relatively low
existing base have been discussed at  length.10 Indeed,  Yes  Scotland’s  strategies  and
organisation serve as an interesting example of a single-issue campaign successfully
growing  into  a  mass  social  movement  which  continued  to  expand after  it  lost  the
referendum of September 2014, having achieved 45% of the vote. Although its outcome
was  the  status  quo,  the  long  independence  referendum  campaign  appears  to  have
transformed Scottish politics on a much deeper level than might have been expected.
SNP membership soared as it became the third largest political party in the UK and its
electoral results soon followed suit as the May 2015 general election results returned a
“nationalist  tsunami”11 of  56 SNP MPs to Westminster out  of  a  total  of  59,  sending
shockwaves in UK political circles. 
12 The May 2016 Scottish Parliament election results – albeit less spectacular – confirmed
the profound changes that had appeared in the Scottish political debate as the SNP
secured  a  third  term  in  government,  falling  only  two  seats  short  of  a  second
consecutive overall majority in the Scottish Parliament. The division between the pro-
independence parties  led by the SNP within the Yes  campaign and the three main
unionist  parties  sharing  a  single  political  platform  within  the  Better  Together
campaign has appeared to survive the referendum and created a new binary system
centred along a fracture between unionists and nationalists. The three partners of the
Better Together campaign represented both the left and right wings of the political
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spectrum,  yet  their  association  to  represent  a  common  position  within  a  single
organization  during  the  independence  referendum  campaign  suggests  that  these
traditional left/right divisions were largely made redundant when the main issue at
stake was the constitutional future of Scotland.
 
Unionist parties and devolution: the case of Labour
13 Although Scottish Labour and the Scottish Conservatives shared a unionist platform,
there were significant differences in their attitudes towards devolution and Scotland’s
constitutional  position.  The  Labour  party  had  fully  participated  in  the  Scottish
Constitutional Convention and introduced devolution under Prime Minister Tony Blair,
but  the  Conservative  party  had  been  traditionally  opposed  to  devolution  which,  it
claimed  with  considerable  foreboding,  would  serve  as  a  “slippery  slope  to
independence”.  The  introduction  of  devolution  to  Scotland  in  1999  was  therefore
apprehended in a very different way by each party and a comparison of both parties’
structural and organizational evolution since 1999 may give some clues as to the impact
of devolution on each party’s electoral fortunes in the last twenty years. Indeed, both
parties  had  to  adapt  to  the  new  political  structures  introduced  by  devolution  and
embodied by the new Scottish Parliament,  but  also to a  distinctly Scottish political
debate, removed from the pan-British political system in which both parties had been
hegemonic since the post-war period. While comparative studies on multi-level party
politics suggest that there is often a declining capacity of the major parties to maintain
political hegemony due not only to a proliferation of new party alternatives, as is the
case in Scotland, but also to a pluralization of political rifts with the classical functional
divides of class and religion losing saliency in structuring party competition, they also
point to regional advocacy as a central strand of sub-state party competition.12 In other
words,  campaigning  on  specific  Scottish  issues  and  in  defence  of  distinct  Scottish
interests became key to winning elections. However, this was all the more difficult for
UK-wide parties  such as  Labour and the Conservatives  as  the context  of  governing
diverged between Westminster and Holyrood. Both parties soon struggled to elaborate
uniform party strategies and policy platforms which would be satisfactory to voters
north and south of the border and provide solutions and benefits to all parts of Britain
despite  each  nation’s  distinctive  economic  and  social  characteristics,  interests  and
concerns. Besides, the constitutional issue proved to be a particular stumbling block for
Labour. While the two main British parties needed to find programmatic answers to the
SNP’s demands for independence, the Labour party found it perhaps more arduous to
propose a satisfactory compromise between the SNP’s independence stance and the
Conservatives’  status  quo and to  adopt  a  clear  position within the starkly  polarized
unionist-separatist political divide. We shall see that the European referendum of June
2016 and the Brexit process would further exacerbate those difficulties as the Remain/
Leave divide followed neither strict partisan lines, nor the constitutional divide.
14 Until 2007, Labour was in power in both London and Edinburgh and while coalition
politics in the latter provided some degree of divergence, partisan harmony and policy
coherence were facilitated by the party’s  electoral  hegemony as  well  as  a  common
political ground shared by the leaderships of both the UK and Scottish parties. Laffin et
al. note that conflicts between the UK party and the Scottish party were few and far
between while Labour was in power in both Westminster and Holyrood, thus indicating
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either  a  high  degree  of  party  consensus  or  strict  leadership  efforts  to  avoid  overt
disagreements  by  marginalising  opponents,  stifling  contradictory  demands,  shaping
rules or managing the decision-making process.13 Indeed, there appeared to be a strong
impetus to respect the message and creed of British Labour and a top-down approach
to policy was itself ensured by the then highly centralised structure of the party. 
15 Admittedly,  Labour  did  take  into  account  to  at  least  some  degree  the  need  to
decentralise some policy-making responsibilities after having introduced devolution. A
new Scottish Policy Forum was created in 1998.  It  was modelled after  the National
Policy Forum, responsible for UK policy development, and would propose and elaborate
policy  ideas  in  devolved  matters.  Its  recommendations  would  be  subjected  to  the
decision of the Scottish Conference and, if approved, could be added to the Scottish
manifesto. Besides, the Scottish Conference, which had only held an advisory function
before devolution, became a sovereign body capable of determining by a two-thirds
majority which devolved policy item could form part of the Scottish Labour party’s
programme and perhaps be included in its manifesto. However, the final drafting of the
manifesto remained the responsibility of a committee equally drawn from the Scottish
Executive Committee and the Scottish Parliamentary Labour Group and these changes
therefore  continued  to  imply  a  continuous  top-down  process  involving  the  party
leadership  rather  than  a  bottom-up  approach  to  policy.  Reserved  matters  were
furthermore decided by the national policy procedures within the National Executive
Committee  and  Scottish  Labour  was  allowed  very  little  input  with  its  modest
contribution of 12 members out of a total of 180 in the National Policy Forum. Although
the  responsibility  of  candidate  selection  was  entrusted  to  the  Scottish  Executive
Committee (SEC) for Holyrood selections, the National Executive Committee – to which
the SEC remains accountable – kept jurisdiction over all other selections. Finally, the
relative autonomy of the Scottish party was also minimized by the material support of
the  UK party  upon  which  the  Scottish  party  has  become  increasingly  dependent14,
thereby tempering divergence in policy choices. 
16 The Scottish Labour party was nonetheless able to somewhat overcome this structural
straitjacket and pursue a divergent political path to that proposed by the pro-business
market-oriented New Labour party in London while it was in government. Yet this was
due to Scotland’s distinct institutional landscape and to the new centre-left consensus
that  emerged  in  the  Scottish  Parliament.  In  contrast  to  its  British  counterpart  in
Westminster, Scottish Labour had to compete with other centre-left parties rather than
the Conservative party. Rather than being fought across the left-right continuum, the
Scottish electoral  battle took place in a left  to centre arena with the constitutional
question cutting across it, thus requiring a more flexible approach to policy. One of the
main divergences came over the question of tuition fees as a result of the coalition
agreement  between  Scottish  Labour  and  the  Scottish  Liberal-Democrats.  The  latter
having argued in favour of scrapping tuition fees altogether in Scotland, a compromise
was reached between the two partners of the new Scottish Executive and a Graduate
Endowment Grant scheme was introduced in Scotland with the Education (Graduate
Endowment and Student Support)  (Scotland) Act 2001,  whereby students would not
have to pay for their tuition fees up front but would reimburse a fixed amount of £2,289
after having graduated.  Some areas of  policy such as education or health therefore
inevitably diverged north and south of  the border,  yet  there were surprisingly few
clashes over policy and party discipline appeared to have prevailed. The row over free
personal  care  to  the  elderly  was  the  most  notable  exception as  its  introduction in
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Scotland made it difficult for British Labour to argue that the policy was unaffordable
without appearing incoherent.15 Yet, the Scottish party itself was bitterly divided over
the issue and the row did not, therefore, represent a straightforward conflict between
the UK and Scottish parties. In fact, it was not before November 2007 that a true rift did
emerge between both parties. Unsurprisingly, the bone of contention was that of an
independence referendum which former Scottish leader Wendy Alexander called for
during a live BBC interview (the famous “Bring it on” episode). Her bold move was not
supported by her colleagues in London or by the Prime Minister. She was thereafter
obliged to back down and was shunned by the Labour leadership when she became
caught up in a campaign funding scandal which ultimately led to her resignation. The
episode suggested that policy divergences were admitted so long as they concerned
devolved matters and did not question or undermine the Labour party’s brand politics
and message. Yet, it also pointed to the inherent weakness of the Scottish Labour party
as it had to choose between the cohesive electoral message of the party as a whole and
its own electoral priorities in a different political landscape. 
17 Indeed,  Labour’s  position  on  the  political  spectrum in  Scotland’s  devolved  political
environment has proved to be particularly problematic. While its UK counterpart faces
little  competition  to  the  left,  Scottish Labour  has  to  contend with  several  left  and
centre-left  parties,  including the SNP,  RISE (which was formed out  of  the union of
several radical movements active in the independence referendum campaign) and the
Scottish Greens. There are, for instance, few differences to be found between Labour
and the SNP on a wide set of issues, as both parties broadly agree on opposing cuts to
public services and protecting the welfare system, opposing the renewal of Trident and
supporting a living wage. This makes it particularly difficult for Labour to distinguish
its political programme and brand message from the other centre-left to left parties in
Scotland,  notably with that of  the SNP, whose leader,  Nicola Sturgeon, remains the
most popular political figure in Scotland. 
18 In contrast, Scottish Labour has had eight different leaders since the introduction of
devolution with few high-profile figures among them. With party heavyweights and
ambitious  young  politicians  preferring  to  build  their  careers  in  Westminster,  the
Scottish Labour party’s electoral scores have consequently suffered from its lacklustre
leaderships and campaigns. Besides, the radical momentum created by Jeremy Corbyn’s
leadership election in September 2015 failed to take hold of Scotland where the core
issue  of  Scotland’s  constitutional  future  and  the  radical  character  of  the  pro-
independence movement during the referendum debate in Scotland have acted as a
substitute to the kind of radicalism that has attracted young activists back to Labour
elsewhere in Britain, notably through the student fees protests south of the border. In a
nation where there are no student fees, the political awakening of young voters came
not with the fees movement but with the independence campaign.16 Scottish Labour
has consequently failed to renew its membership and voter bases as the young radical
vote in Scotland has now defected to pro-independence parties, not least to the SNP
whose members below the age of 30 account for 21% of its total membership. 
19 Finally,  Scottish  Labour’s  position  over  the  constitutional  future  of  Scotland  has
plagued  the  party  since  the  independence  referendum  of  2014.  Scottish  Labour’s
doomed decision to participate in the Better Together No campaign alongside the two
coalition government partners  of  the time has durably damaged the party’s  image,
firstly  because  it  stood  on  the  same  political  platform  as  the  Conservatives  and
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secondly  because  of  the  negativity  of  the  Better  Together  campaign.  The  Better
Together campaign was led by a senior Labour figure, Alistair Darling, and became an
easy target for the SNP, which could present the umbrella campaign as a Conservative-
led initiative which gathered three British rather than Scottish parties and generally
defended  austerity  policies  and  welfare  cuts.  The  2014  referendum  campaign  has
therefore lastingly damaged the Labour party’s image in Scotland as well as its electoral
scores. 
20 The Scottish Labour party was almost wiped out in the 2015 general election and only
retained a single seat in Scotland, like both its unionist rivals, while the SNP won 56 out
of the 59 Scottish Westminster seats.  It  then lost 13 seats in the May 2016 Scottish
Parliament elections and was unable to take advantage of the outcome of the June 2016
European  referendum in  which  a  majority  of  Scots  voted  Remain.  Indeed,  Scottish
Labour only managed to win a handful of seats (7) in the 2017 general election despite
the  extraordinary  circumstances  created  by  the  Brexit  context.  The  Labour  party’s
ambiguous position over the Brexit issue, its divisions over the issue and its hesitations
to back a “People’s Vote” meant that it failed to seize the opportunity provided to use
the campaign as a pro-European platform in Scotland. Meeting little resistance from
Labour and taking advantage of  the divisions created by the European issue within
Nationalist ranks, the Scottish Conservatives were able to minimize the issue during
the  campaign,  preferring  instead  to  concentrate  on  the  constitutional  issue  and
fighting a  staunchly unionist  campaign.  Against  all  odds,  the Conservatives made a
shock electoral comeback in Scotland as they won 13 Scottish seats and saved Theresa
May’s Conservative government.
 
The Scottish Conservatives: unionism, Europe and the
constitutional issue
21 Indeed,  the  Scottish  Conservative  Party  came out  of  the  independence  referendum
campaign unscathed and ascertained in its belief that it stood for Scottish unionism,
which it thereafter fully embraced as its flagship policy in ensuing electoral campaigns.
However, rather than opposing devolution as a “slippery slope to independence” as it
had  before  the  1997  referendum,  the  Conservatives  now fully  engaged in  devolved
politics  and  supported  Scottish  unionism  in  a  devolved  environment.  Indeed,  the
Conservative party had felt compelled to engage in a soul-searching debate over its
internal territorial structures after it failed to win a single seat in Scotland in the 1997
general election. Although the Scottish Unionist Party had remained an affiliated yet
constitutionally separate party until 1965, direct authority was thereafter exercised by
the British leadership and the Conservative Party had maintained a very centralized
approach to party organization. The shock results of 1997 nevertheless led the Scottish
Conservative  Party  to  become  an  affiliated  partner  of  the  Conservative  Party. It
continued to participate fully in UK-wide processes, but its organization and internal
procedures, over which it gained statutory control, were now independently managed.
The Party Constitution therefore holds that Scottish members are obliged to follow UK
party rules with respect to UK matters but will follow Scottish party rules with respect
to Scottish matters, thereby enabling the Scottish party to acquire more autonomy in
its management of devolved policy-making and organization. Besides, it was never as
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dependent as Labour on membership fees, despite a similar centralist funding model,
because the bulk of its funding is provided by individual donors and corporations. 
22 The 1998 party reform established both a party executive committee (Governing Board)
responsible for the management of the party and a Conservative Policy Forum, charged
with organizing policy debates and programmatic development. The Forum only has an
advisory character and the elaboration of policy programmes and electoral manifestos
remains largely in the hands of the parliamentary leader and his/her inner circle. Yet,
in contrast with Scottish Labour,  the Scottish Conservatives have enjoyed a greater
degree of autonomy with respect to devolved policies as the Scottish election manifesto
emerges from within the Scottish Conservative parliamentary group and is  debated
within  the  Scottish  constituencies  and  the  regional  party  executive.  The  Scottish
Conservatives can therefore develop their own proposals for Scottish matters without
formal interference by the national party leadership. This autonomy has thus enabled
the Scottish party to  develop a  more moderate,  centrist  policy  profile  on devolved
issues in order to better adapt to the new devolved Scottish political landscape.17 Yet,
the Scottish Conservatives’ fundamental conception of unionism remained intact until
the 2014 independence referendum.
23 The  2011  leadership  election  was  the  first  contested  leadership  election  since  the
introduction  of  devolution  and  therefore  provided  the  opportunity  for  a  public
discussion of the future of the party. Two factions emerged during the campaign, with
one faction arguing that devolution should not be enhanced any further and that the
Scottish Conservatives  should remain integrated to  the UK Conservative Party,  and
another claiming that the Scottish Conservative Party had become more autonomous
and should be open to leading the debate on further powers to the Scottish Parliament.
The  former  view was  represented  by  Ruth  Davidson,  Jackson Carlaw and Margaret
Mitchell, while the latter was strongly defended by Murdo Fraser in his leadership bid
as  he  argued  that  the  party  should  disband  and  reform  itself  as  a  Scottish  party
modelled along the lines of the former Unionist Party, that is a separate party with MPs
nevertheless  taking  the  Conservative  whip  at  Westminster.  With  Ruth  Davidson
narrowly  elected  as  leader,  it  appeared that  continuity  had prevailed  and that  the
Conservatives  would  remain  opposed  to  any  further  extension  of  the  Scottish
Parliament’s  powers.  Yet,  the  new Scottish  Conservative  leader  was  soon forced to
change her mind by Prime Minister David Cameron’s own admission in a February 2012
speech that “This does not have to be the end of the road. When the referendum on
independence is over,  I  am open to looking at how the devolved settlement can be
improved  further”18.  The  Conservative-led  Coalition  government’s  strategy  was  to
accept  the  organisation  of  a  referendum,  which  was  now unavoidable,  on  terms  it
found acceptable and to avoid appearing anti-Scottish in a bid to save the union. Ruth
Davidson therefore had no choice but to come round to the view initially expressed by
Fraser  and  set  up  a  Conservative  commission  to  examine  the  current  devolution
settlement and make proposals for a possible extension of the Scottish Parliament’s
powers. The Commission on the Future Governance of Scotland published its report in
May  2014  and  made  rather  timid  proposals  for  further  devolution  to  Scotland,
suggesting that the Scottish Parliament should become responsible for setting rates
and bands of income tax throughout Scotland but that pensions should stay within the
remit of the UK Government, and admitting there was a case for devolving housing
benefit  and attendance allowance as  well  as  conferring the Scottish Parliament the
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power of supplementing benefits legislated for at UK level. These proposals, however,
represented a revolution for the Scottish Conservative party as it finally came to terms
with devolution and attempted to reconcile a Conservative brand of unionism with a
centre-right case for further autonomy, particularly regarding fiscal powers.
24 The  Scottish  Conservatives  were  thereafter  able  to  build  upon a  coherent  unionist
strategy which integrated both conservative political thought and further autonomy
for Scotland, and the strong Scottish credentials of their new leader, whose working-
class  background and comprehensive education made it  possible for her to present
herself as an untypical Tory and put what she described as “clear blue water” between
the policies of the Scottish Conservatives and those of the UK party. Ruth Davidson has
indeed frequently  shown  her  independence  from  Westminster  politics:  she  was  a
staunch Remain supporter during the referendum campaign and has repeatedly said
since then that she was favourable to “an open Brexit, rather than a closed Brexit” with the
“largest amount of access” to the Single Market. She challenged a number of immigration
policies  espoused by May during her time as  Home Secretary and urged the Prime
Minister to reconsider the Conservative target to cut net migration to below 100,000 a
year as well as drop “easy slogans” on immigration. She signalled her opposition to
May’s deal with the DUP by tweeting a link to the same-sex marriage lecture she gave
at Amnesty’s Pride lecture in Belfast in 2016, sought and received assurances from the
Prime Minister that she should try to advance gay rights in Northern Ireland despite
the DUP’s record on such issues. Finally, she has admitted to being a centrist in terms of
social policy with a more right-wing stance on justice and fiscal policies.
25 The  diverging  strategy  of  the  Scottish  Conservative  party  from its  UK counterpart
became  most  apparent  during  the  2017  general  election  campaign.  Ruth  Davidson
chose  to  concentrate  on  the  constitutional  issue  despite  the “strong  and  stable”
campaign message that her party had set out to develop nationally in order to make of
the 2017 general election one that focused on the Prime Minister’s persona and would
strengthen her hand to deliver Brexit. Although she was under pressure from the party
leadership to respect the Conservative campaign message, Ruth Davidson’s decision to
stray away from it proved correct because the political debate north of the border has
become  strikingly  different.  Firstly,  the  SNP’s  campaign  was  overshadowed  by  the
European  question  despite  its  attempt  not  to  focus  only  on  its  “independence  in
Europe” mantra or on the issue of a second referendum. This considerably divided the
SNP’s  electorate  as  nearly  a  third  of  Yes  voters  at  the  2014  referendum  and  an
estimated 36% of SNP voters voted Leave at the EU referendum. In fact, a YouGov poll
of January 2017 showed that only 65% of Yes voters who backed Leave said they would
back  independence  again.  In  contrast,  the  Scottish  Conservatives  argued that  their
party were negotiating a Brexit deal for the UK, and Ruth Davidson repeatedly stated
her  preference  for  a  soft  Brexit  and  stark  opposition  to  a  second  independence
referendum.  This  strategy  appears  to  have  functioned  insofar  as  the  Conservative
resurgence in Scotland at the 2017 general election occurred predominantly amongst
those who voted No in 2014, wining as much as 44% of the vote among this group (up 17
points since 2015), well ahead of Labour’s 36% whose more uncertain message on the
constitutional issue has failed to make it profitable in terms of vote. More significantly
perhaps is that the Scottish Conservatives obtained 8% of the vote among Yes voters,
that is 5% more than in 2015. This progression among Yes voters is accounted for by the
number of Leave voters among them. Indeed, just over one in five (21%) of those who
voted Yes and Leave voted for the Scottish Conservatives in June 2017. Ruth Davidson’s
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campaign thus clipped the wings of the Nationalists as she argued that an anticipated
second independence referendum would be unfair to voters who had not been given
sufficient time to make an informed decision.
26 Secondly, general elections in Scotland are paradoxical insofar as much of the policy
agenda  matters  little  because  it  is  devolved  to  the  Scottish  Parliament.  The
controversies  over  Theresa  May’s  manifesto  thus  had  little  resonance  in  Scotland
where the Scottish Tory leader was able to argue that it  did not concern Scotland.
Besides, May’s most controversial policy on social care – the so-called “dementia tax” –
was in fact more generous than the existing system in Scotland: while Scotland does
provide free social care to the elderly in their own homes, only £26,000 of pensioners’
assets are protected when they go into residential care rather than the £100,000 figure
given by the Prime Minister. It was in none of the main Scottish parties’ interests to
explain how much more generous the UK Prime Minister’s proposal was, and the issue
was therefore absent from the Scottish campaign. Moreover, the Scottish Conservatives
had  declared  themselves  opposed  to  any  changes  to  fox-hunting  rules  in  Scotland
before Theresa May controversially pledged in May 2017 that she would allow a free
vote  in  Parliament  over  the  relaxing  of  rules  or  repeal  of  the  Hunting  Act  2004.
Davidson’s Scottish Conservatives were able to exploit a grey area over which welfare
policies were devolved to Scotland to rule out any cuts to winter fuel allowances in
their manifesto, arguing that there was no need for cuts in fuel allowances in Scotland
to fund the so-called “dementia tax” since the country would not be affected by it. With
all  potentially  explosive  issues  contained  north  of  the  border,  the  Scottish
Conservatives were thus able to concentrate on the constitutional issue and deliver
positive results in Scotland, obtaining a total of 13 seats (+12) and increasing their share
of the vote by 13.7%.
 
Conclusion
27 The results of both the European referendum of June 2016 and the general election of
June 2017 proved just how different a political landscape Scotland had become after
two decades of devolved government. Scotland’s traditionally more left-wing political
culture and the centre-left political consensus which has emerged in Holyrood in the
last  twenty  years  has  meant  that  anti-European  voices  have  had  extremely  feeble
resonance north of the border: only 16.5% of Scots voted for pro-Brexit parties at the
2015 general election (14.9% voted for the Conservative Party and 1.6% for UKIP) and a
majority of Scottish Conservative MPs and MSPs campaigned for Remain, a position
strongly defended by their leader, Ruth Davidson. Ironically, the electoral comeback
achieved by the Scottish Conservatives in Scotland in the 2017 general election, despite
the losses suffered by their party in the rest of the UK, was made possible by their
strong  unionist  stance  and  the  divisions  created  by  the  Brexit  debate  within  the
Nationalist movement. Scottish Labour on the other hand, failed to emulate its British
counterpart  insofar  as  there  was  no  significant  swing  to  Labour  in  key  seats  in
Scotland.  The electoral  campaign in  Scotland was once again overshadowed by the
constitutional question – over which Labour has had trouble defining a clear position –
made  all  the  more  complex  by  the  current  Brexit  negotiations  and  the  looming
prospect of seeing Scotland taken out of the EU despite a clear 62% majority in favour
of Remain. The constitutional divide has come to dominate Scottish politics since the
Twenty Years of Devolution in Scotland: the End of a British Party System?
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXIV-4 | 2019
13
introduction of  devolution in 1999 and devolution itself  has transformed Scotland’s
political landscape to the extent that many of the party dynamics or campaign issues
prevalent in Westminster have little if no significance north of the border. The country
now  appears  as  having  a  self-contained  political  system  of  its  own,  functioning
alongside rather than in coordination with the British political system. Yet, ironically,
the Scottish Conservatives’ 13 seats in the 2017 general election were crucial to Theresa
May’s ability to remain in office and Labour’s electoral slump in Scotland has dented its
chances of winning a general election. Today, no less than 29 Scottish constituencies
are competitive between Labour and the SNP and the prospect for a change in Downing
Street may therefore partly depend on a set of policy issues and debates far removed
from those prevailing in Westminster.
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ABSTRACTS
The geographical divides that characterised the outcome of the June 2016 European referendum,
with a Remain majority in Scotland and Northern Ireland and a Leave majority in England and in
Wales, are symptomatic of the increasingly divergent electoral results of the last two decades in
each of the four UK nations. While the roots of divergent political patterns across the UK may lay
in the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales and
the long decline of the Conservatives north of the border, we shall contend that the introduction
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of devolution to Scotland and Wales in 1999 had the most considerable impact on British party
politics.
Les divisions géographiques qui caractérisèrent les résultats du référendum européen de juin
2016, avec une majorité favorable au maintien du Royaume-Uni au sein de l’Union Européenne en
Écosse et en Irlande du Nord et une majorité opposée en Angleterre et au pays de Galles, sont
symptomatiques  des  résultats  électoraux  de  plus  en  plus  divergents  des  quatre  nations
britanniques au cours de ces deux dernières décennies. Si ces tendances politiques divergentes
puisent leurs racines dans l’émergence des partis nationalistes écossais et gallois des années 1960
et 1970 et le long déclin des conservateurs en Écosse, nous analyserons en quoi l’introduction de
la dévolution en Écosse et au pays de Galles en 1999 eut un impact considérable sur le système
britannique de partis politiques.
INDEX
Mots-clés: dévolution, politique écossaise, SNP, référendum sur l’indépendance de l’Écosse,
Parlement écossais, Brexit
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